merely because, by the question, the idea it suggested
was taken up, and reiterated by the mind; while the sensations caused
by all the rest, were allowed to pass away.

There is another circumstance of daily occurrence, which adds to the
evidence that it is this principle which we have called "reiteration,"
which forms the chief, if not the only avenue, by which ideas find
access to the mind; and it is this:--That when at any time we bring to
recollection some former circumstance of life, however remote, or when
we recall any part of our former knowledge or experience, it comes up to
the mind, accompanied with the perfect consciousness, that, at the time
we are thinking of, this act of reiteration had taken place upon it;
that we most assuredly have thought of it before. We are not more
certain that it occupies our thoughts now, than we are that it did so
when it occurred;--that the operation of which we are at present
speaking, did actually then take place; and that it was by our doing so
then, that it is remembered now. This circumstance, when duly
considered, is of itself, we think, a sufficient proof, that no part of
our knowledge,--not a single idea,--can be acquired, or retained on the
memory by any other process, than by this act of reiteration.

Hence then it is plain, that all the knowledge which we receive by
observation, without the use of language, is received and retained on
the memory by the operation of this principle; and we will now proceed
to shew, that the same process must also take place, when our ideas are
received by means of _words_, whether these be spoken or read.

It is of great importance for us to remember, that the only legitimate
use of words is to convey ideas; and that Nature rigidly refuses to
acknowledge any other use to which they may be put. Hence it is, that in
conversation, we are quite unconscious of the words which our friend
uses in communicating his ideas. Nature impels us to lay hold of the
ideas alone; and in proof of this we find, that we have only to attempt
to concentrate our attention upon the _words_ he uses, and then we are
sure to lose sight of the _ideas_ which the words were intended to
convey. Hence it is, that our opinion of the style, and the language,
and the manner of a speaker, when the subject itself is not familiar,
are formed more by indirect impressions, than by direct attention to
these things while he speaks; and oftener by reflection afterwards, than