s and rewards,
for actions done, it acts in its _executive_ capacity. These two
departments of the moral sense seem quite distinct in their nature and
operations; and, as we shall immediately see, they not only exist
separately, but they sometimes act independently of each other.

2. Another circumstance connected with conscience is, that her
_legislative_ powers do not develope themselves, nor appear to act, till
the reasoning powers of the person begin to expand. Then, and then only
does the pupil of Nature, who has not had the benefit of previous moral
instruction, begin to decide on the merit or demerit of actions.
Infants, and children who are left without instruction, appear to have
no distinct perception that certain actions are right, and others wrong.
In infancy, we frequently perceive the most rebellious outbreakings of
ungoverned passion, with tearing, and scratching, and beating the
parent, without any indication of compunction, either at the time, or
after it has taken place. Even in children of more advanced years, while
they remain without moral instruction, and before the reasoning powers
are developed, the injuries which they occasion to each other, or which
they inflict upon the old, the decrepit, or the helpless, are matters of
unmingled glee and gratification, without the slightest sign of
conscience interfering to prevent them, or of giving them any uneasiness
after the mischief is done. Instead of sorrow, such children are found
invariably delighted with the recollection of their tricks; and never
fail to recapitulate them to their companions afterwards, with triumph
and satisfaction.--But it is not so with the adult. As soon as the
reasoning powers are developed, the legislative functions of conscience
begin to act, enabling and impelling the person to decide at once on
actions, whether they are right or wrong, good or evil. Such a person,
therefore, could not strike nor abuse his parents, without knowing that
he was doing wrong; nor could he tantalize or injure the aged or the
helpless, without conscience putting him upon his guard, as well as
reproving and punishing the crime by compunctious feelings after it was
committed.

From this we perceive, that the legislative powers of conscience are
usually dormant in the child, and do not, when left to Nature, act till
the reasoning powers have exhibited themselves; from which we are led to
conclude, that it is by an _early education_,--by _moral ins