ted
at school, but all the knowledge which they may acquire in their future
journey through life.

FOOTNOTES:

[7] Note F.

CHAP. X.

_On Nature's Method of applying Knowledge by means of the Moral Sense,
or Conscience._

Nature enables her pupils to apply knowledge by means of the moral
sense, or conscience, as well as by the animal, or common sense. There
is however this great difference in the manner in which they
operate,--that whereas every infringement of the natural or physical
laws which regulate the application of knowledge by what we have called
the common sense, is invariably followed by its proper punishment,--the
consequences of infringing the laws which regulate the moral sense, are
neither so immediate, nor at the time so apparent. The child knows, that
by putting his finger to the candle, burning and pain will instantly
follow;--but the evil consequences of purloining sweet-meats, or telling
a lie to avoid punishment, are not so obvious. Does Nature then put less
value on moral integrity, than on worldly prudence? Certainly not. But
in the latter case she deals with man more as a physical and
intellectual being; and in the former, as a moral, a responsible, and an
immortal being. The lower animals to a great extent participate with us
in the benefits arising from attention to the laws which govern physical
enjoyments; but they know nothing of a moral sense, which is peculiar to
intelligent and accountable creatures. From this we may safely conclude,
that the application of knowledge by means of the moral sense, or
conscience, is of infinitely more importance to man than the application
of his knowledge by the animal, or common sense.

For the purpose of arriving at accurate conclusions on this subject, in
reference to education and the application of knowledge, we shall
endeavour to investigate a few of the phenomena connected with the moral
sense, as these are exhibited in the young and in adults; and shall, in
doing so, attempt to trace the laws by which these phenomena are
severally guided.

1. The first thing we would here remark, is, that the operations of the
moral sense appear to be resolvable into two classes, which may be
termed its _legislative_ and its _executive_ powers. When conscience
leads us merely to judge and to decide upon the character of a feeling
or an action, whether good or evil, it acts in its _legislative_
capacity; but when it reproves and punishes, or approve