t decisive blunder was the
march by Linz; the second was yet to be made.

Napoleon's strategy during the following days was, both in his own
opinion and in that of his military commentators, the greatest of his
life. Such had been Berthier's indecision when he saw his blunder that
one general at least--to wit, Pelet--charged him with being a traitor.
In twenty-four hours his puzzled humor and conflicting orders had more
or less demoralized the whole army. But Napoleon's presence inspired
every one with new vigor, from the division commanders to the men in
the ranks. Promptly on the seventeenth the order went forth for Davout
to leave Ratisbon and challenge the enemy to battle by a flank march
up the right bank of the Danube to Ingolstadt in his very face.
Lefebvre was to cover the movement, and Wrede, with one Bavarian
division, was held ready to strengthen any weak spot in case of
battle. Next day Massena was ordered to set out from Augsburg for the
same point, "to unite with the army, catch the enemy at work, and
destroy his columns." To this end he was to march eastward by
Pfaffenhofen. In a twinkling the scattered French army seemed already
concentrated, while scouts came one after the other to announce that
the Austrians were separating.

The Austrians had crossed the Isar in good order, Charles himself at
Landshut. If they had kept directly onward they might have still
wedged themselves between Davout and Lefebvre. But the Archduke grew
timid at the prospect of swamps and wooded hills before him; uncertain
of his enemy's exact position, he threw forward three separate columns
by as many different roads, and thus lengthened his line enormously,
the right wing being at Essenbach, the center advanced before Landshut
to Hohen-Thann, the left at Morsbach. At four in the morning of the
eighteenth Lefebvre received orders to fall on the Austrian left,
while flying messengers followed each other in quick succession to
spur on Massena with urgent pleas of immediate necessity. It was hoped
that he might come up to join an attack which, though intended mainly
to divert the Austrians from Davout, could by his help be turned into
an important victory.

The Archduke during the day collected sixty-six thousand men at Rohr
for his onset, and thirty-five thousand men at Ludmannsdorf to cover
his flank, leaving twenty-five thousand at Moosburg. That night
Davout's last corps, that of Friant, came in, and he began his march.
Mas