s walls of ravines, entrapped by ambushes, or
slaughtered by the scythes, clubs, and pitchforks of the peasantry.

Leaving Eugene to hold the Marchfeld, Napoleon and his army pressed on
after Marmont in pursuit of Charles. Before Znaim, which was reached
on the eleventh, the vanguard had just suffered something very like a
repulse, and the Emperor made ready for another battle if it should be
necessary. In the very midst of the preparations came a proposition
from Charles for an armistice. After a long discussion by the French
generals, Napoleon accepted it. "You must fight only when the hope of
any fortunate turn is gone," he wrote about this time; "for in its
nature the result of a battle is always doubtful." The Archduke's
motive was to gain time. The Emperor Francis had accepted a plan
proposed by John for a reunion of the Austrian armies on the confines
of Hungary to continue the war, and he was still hoping to retrieve
the blunder he had made in not negotiating on equal terms with
Prussia. He therefore acquiesced in Charles's proposal, though not
intending the armistice as a preliminary of peace. Napoleon affected
uncertainty, and demanded an enormous cession of territory as the
price of a truce. Francis in turn demurred, but finally yielded. To
this again Charles, confident in his ability to carry on the war,
would not listen. His quarrel with Francis and John was growing more
bitter; and the Emperor felt that in order to compose the family
difficulties and allay jealousies, time must now be gained at any
price. Francis therefore persisted, Charles resigned the command, and
the former assumed it himself.

The Austrian Emperor's first step was to open negotiations in the hope
of prolonging them until he could rearrange the control of his army
and recuperate his strength, trusting that in the interval the
kaleidoscope of European diplomacy might entirely change. He was not
disappointed in the fact of a change, but the change was far different
from what he had expected. The King of Prussia now definitely withdrew
the propositions which he had half-heartedly made before Wagram. He
thought it was better to reign behind the Oder than not to reign at
all. The Czar kept the promise made at Erfurt most unwillingly; but
having at last secured Finland, he felt bound to fulfil the letter of
his engagement. Prince Galitzin had been put at the head of thirty
thousand unwilling Russians, and sent to invade Galicia. Crossing th