e
exactly which alternative Napoleon desired; but in view of his general
character, of the treaty he had made with Francis, and of subsequent
events, it was probably the latter. He could have used the Czar's
compliance to found his dynasty, but he seems to have made up his mind
that Austria was the better dependence. Besides, he had very serious
reasons of state for urgency. He recognized at every step of his
career that his power rested in the popular will, not on tradition or
theories. Hence, at every moment two purposes were immediate: first,
to keep the popular favor; second, to transform his tenure of power by
the infusion of a dynastic element.

In the winter of 1809 the people of France were not comfortable. The
promised peace with England seemed again postponed; the war in the
Spanish peninsula was still raging; the Continental System was
steadily undermining public prosperity. There was stagnation in the
great French seaports; hand in hand with commerce, both industry and
trade were languishing. The great southern towns, deprived of their
Spanish market, were nearly bankrupt. In addition the clergy and their
adherents were thoroughly roused by the treatment of the Pope. On the
other hand, the Emperor's personal popularity was also suffering
serious ravages. In the new administrative system the places which led
to promotion had now for a long time been given to members of the old
nobility; the recipients looked on them as their right, and neither
they nor their families were grateful, while the sturdy democracy felt
slighted and injured. Even the new nobility grew more unmanageable
with every day. In full possession of their estates, titles, and
incomes, they felt their independence, and refused to be longer guided
by the hand which had led them into their promised land. They had
allied themselves with the oldest families in France, and the
haughtiness of family pride led them to feel condescension for the
great adventurer whose blood so far flowed in no aristocratic veins.
It seemed to Napoleon that in order to secure popular good will he
must restore prosperity, which was not easy, and to assert a moral
ascendancy over his court he must make a suitable match, which was
easy enough. Neither must be half done; his prestige required a great
stroke, and it was better to make the match first, and thereby ease
the tension until England could be brought to terms--with Russia's aid
if possible, without it if necessar