FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   241   242   243   244   245   246   247   248   249   250   251   252   253   254   255   256   257   258   259   260   261   262   263   264   265  
266   267   268   269   270   271   272   273   274   275   276   277   278   279   280   281   282   283   284   285   286   287   288   289   290   >>   >|  
e present state of the world than we have to inquire into the causes of those causes, and again the still earlier causes, and so on to infinity. But, this being impossible, we must be content, wherever we stop, to contemplate the uncaused, that is, the unexplained; and then all that follows is only relatively explained. Besides this difficulty, however, there is another that prevents the perfecting of any theory of the abstract material world, namely (b), that it involves more than one first principle. For we have seen that the Uniformity of Nature is not really a principle, but a merely nominal generalisation, since it cannot be definitely stated; and, therefore, the principles of Contradiction, Mediate Equality, and Causation remain incapable of subsumption; nor can any one of them be reduced to another: so that they remain unexplained. (3) Another limit to explanation lies in the infinite character of every particular fact; so that we may know the laws of many of its properties and yet come far short of understanding it as a whole. A lump of sandstone in the road: we may know a good deal about its specific gravity, temperature, chemical composition, geological conditions; but if we inquire the causes of the particular modifications it exhibits of these properties, and further why it is just so big, containing so many molecules, neither more nor less, disposed in just such relations to one another as to give it this particular figure, why it lies exactly there rather than a yard off, and so forth, we shall get no explanation of all this. The causes determining each particular phenomenon are infinite, and can never be computed; and, therefore, it can never be fully explained. Sec. 8. Analogy is used in two senses: (1) for the resemblance of relations between terms that have little or no resemblance--as _The wind drives the clouds as a shepherd drives his sheep_--where wind and shepherd, clouds and sheep are totally unlike. Such analogies are a favourite figure in poetry and rhetoric, but cannot prove anything. For valid reasoning there must be parallel cases, according to substance and attribute, or cause and effect, or proportion: e.g. _As cattle and deer are to herbivorousness, so are camels; As bodies near the earth fall toward it, so does the moon; As 2 is to 3 so is 4 to 6._ (2) Analogy is discussed in Logic as a kind of probable proof based upon imperfect similarity (as the best that can be discovered) be
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   241   242   243   244   245   246   247   248   249   250   251   252   253   254   255   256   257   258   259   260   261   262   263   264   265  
266   267   268   269   270   271   272   273   274   275   276   277   278   279   280   281   282   283   284   285   286   287   288   289   290   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

resemblance

 
principle
 
properties
 

infinite

 

clouds

 

drives

 

shepherd

 

remain

 

explanation

 

Analogy


relations

 
figure
 

unexplained

 
explained
 
inquire
 

disposed

 

computed

 

senses

 

determining

 

phenomenon


herbivorousness

 

camels

 

bodies

 

discussed

 

imperfect

 
similarity
 

discovered

 

probable

 

cattle

 
poetry

rhetoric

 

favourite

 

analogies

 

totally

 
unlike
 

reasoning

 

effect

 
proportion
 

attribute

 

substance


parallel
 

involves

 

material

 

prevents

 

perfecting

 

theory

 

abstract

 

Uniformity

 

nominal

 
generalisation