500,000 men. The total resources available
for the war were therefore 8,500,000. Out of these about one-half, say
4,000,000, are now at the front. The definitive losses represent at
least 1,300,000 men. The available resources amounted, then, at the
beginning of January, to 3,200,000 men.
GERMANY'S RESERVES UNTRAINED.
Of what are these resources composed? Chiefly of men who were untrained
in time of peace, the trained reservists having almost all left the
depots for the front. It has, moreover, to be noted that out of these
3,200,000 men there are, according to the statistics, 800,000 who are
more than 39 years of age, and therefore of only mediocre military
value. Thus there remain 2,400,000. Finally, the category of the
untrained in peace comprises, according to the estimates of German
military authorities themselves, one-quarter of inefficients.
The really valuable resources capable of campaigning are therefore just
2,000,000. These men, comprising the 1915, 1916, and 1917 classes,
called out in anticipation, constitute--and this point cannot be too
strongly insisted upon--the total of available resources for the
operations during the twelve months of 1915. As to what the military
value of these troops will be, considering the haste with which they
have been trained, the formidable losses sustained in the battle of
Flanders by the newly formed corps show very clearly. Their military
value will be limited.
GERMAN LOSSES 260,000 A MONTH.
When it is remembered that, according to the German documents
themselves, the definite loss each month is 260,000 men, it is manifest
that the available resources for the year 1915 will not suffice to fill
the gaps of a war of ten months.
It is then superabundantly established that in the matter of effectives
Germany has reached the maximum of possible effort. If with the men at
present available she creates, as it is certain that she is preparing to
do at this moment, fresh formations, she will be preventing herself, if
the war lasts another ten months, as is admissible, from being able to
complete afresh her old formations. If she creates no new formations,
she will have in 1915 exactly what is necessary and no more to complete
the existing units afresh.
Bearing in mind the ways of the German General Staff, one may suppose
that, disregarding the eventual impossibility of recompleting, it is
still addressing itself to creating new formations. The weakness to
which
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