which the
German armies were able to advance from Aug. 25 to Sept. 5, gave our
adversaries a feeling of absolute and final superiority, which
manifested itself at that time by all the statements gleaned and all the
documents seized.

At the moment of the battle of the Marne the first impression was one of
failure of comprehension and of stupor. A great number of German
soldiers, notably those who fell into our hands during the first days of
that battle, believed fully, as at the end of August, that the retreat
they were ordered to make was only a means of luring us into a trap.
German military opinion was suddenly converted when the soldiers saw
that this retreat continued, and that it was being carried out in
disorder, under conditions which left no doubt as to its cause and its
extent.

This time it was really a defeat, and a defeat aggravated by the absence
of regular supplies and by the physical and moral depression which was
the result. The severity of the losses sustained, the overpowering
effects of the French artillery, began from this moment to be noted in
the German pocketbooks with veritable terror. Hope revived, however, at
the end of some weeks, and there is to be found in the letters of
soldiers and officers the announcement of "a great movement" which is
being prepared, and which is to lead the German armies anew as far as
Paris.

LOSSES IN "BATTLE OF CALAIS."

This is the great "battle of Calais," which, contrary to the
anticipations of the enemy, was in reality fought to the east of the
Yser. The losses of the Germans, which during those ten days exceeded
150,000 men, and may perhaps have reached 200,000, produced a terrifying
impression on the troops. From that moment prisoners no longer declared
themselves sure of success. For a certain time they had been consoled
by the announcement of the capture of Warsaw. This pretended success
having proved to be fictitious, incredulity became general.

During the last two months the most intelligent of the prisoners have
all admitted that no one could any longer say on which side victory
would rest. If we think of the absolute confidence with which the German
people had been sustained, this avowal is of great importance.

Letters seized on a dead officer speak of the imminence of a military
and economic hemming-in of Germany. They discuss the possibility of
Germany finding herself after the war with "empty hands and pockets
turned inside out." There is