e does not prevent the establishment of slavery, either with
reference to persons or place; but simply inhibits the removal from
place to place (the law in each being the same) of a slave, or make his
emancipation the consequence of that removal. It acts professedly merely
on slavery as it exists, and thus acting restrains its present lawful
effects. That slavery, like many other human institutions, originated
in fraud or violence, may be conceded: but, however it originated, it is
established among us, and no man seeks a further establishment of it
by new importations of freemen to be converted into slaves. On the
contrary, all are anxious to mitigate its evils, by all the means within
the reach of the appropriate authority, the domestic legislatures of the
different States.

* * * * *

Of the declaration of our independence, which has also been quoted in
support of the perilous doctrines now urged upon us, I need not now
speak at large. I have shown on a former occasion how idle it is to rely
upon that instrument for such a purpose, and I will not fatigue you by
mere repetition. The self-evident truths announced in the Declaration
of Independence are not truths at all, if taken literally; and the
practical conclusions contained in the same passage of that declaration
prove that they were never designed to be so received.

The articles of confederation contain nothing on the subject; whilst the
actual Constitution recognizes the legal existence of slavery by various
provisions. The power of prohibiting the slave trade is involved in that
of regulating commerce, but this is coupled with an express inhibition
to the exercise of it for twenty years. How then can that Constitution
which expressly permits the importation of slaves authorize the National
Government to set on foot a crusade against slavery?

The clause respecting fugitive slaves is affirmative and active in its
effects. It is a direct sanction and positive protection of the right of
the master to the services of his slave as derived under the local laws
of the States. The phraseology in which it is wrapped up still leaves
the intention clear, and the words, "persons held to service or labor
in one State under the laws thereof," have always been interpreted to
extend to the case of slaves, in the various acts of Congress which
have been passed to give efficacy to the provision, and in the judicial
application of those laws. So also in t