broad, so also must be
the migration--no other termini being assigned to the one which are not
manifestly characteristic of the other. This conclusion is so obvious,
that to repel it, the word migration requires, as an appendage,
explanatory phraseology, giving to it a different beginning from that
of importation. To justify the conclusion that it was intended to mean a
removal from State to State, each within the sphere of the constitution
in which it is used, the addition of the words from one to another State
in this Union, were indispensable. By the omission of these words, the
word "migration" is compelled to take every sense of which it is fairly
susceptible from its immediate neighbor, "importation." In this view
it means a coming, as "importation" means a bringing, from a foreign
jurisdiction into the United States. That it is susceptible of this
meaning, nobody doubts. I go further. It can have no other meaning in
the place in which it is found. It is found in the Constitution of this
Union--which, when it speaks of migration as of a general concern, must
be supposed to have in view a migration into the domain which itself
embraces as a general government.
Migration, then, even if it comprehends slaves, does not mean the
removal of them from State to State, but means the coming of slaves
from places beyond their limits and their power. And if this be so, the
gentlemen gain nothing for their argument by showing that slaves were
the objects of this term.
An honorable gentleman from Rhode Island, whose speech was distinguished
for its ability, and for an admirable force of reasoning, as well to
as by the moderation and mildness of its spirit, informed us, with less
discretion than in general he exhibited, that the word "migration" was
introduced into this clause at the instance of some of the Southern
States, who wished by its instrumentality to guard against a prohibition
by Congress of the passage into those States of slaves from other
States. He has given us no authority for this supposition, and it is,
therefore, a gratuitous one. How improbable it is, a moment's reflection
will convince him. The African slave trade being open during the whole
of the time to which the entire clause in question referred, such a
purpose could scarcely be entertained; but if it had been entertained,
and there was believed to be a necessity for securing it, by a
restriction upon the power of Congress to interfere with it, is it
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