at the divergence of the two sections, indicated in
Calhoun's speech of 1850, had widened to an absolute separation in
thought, feeling, and purpose. In the latter the debates assumed a
virulence which is illustrated by the speeches on the Sumner assault.
The current of events had at least carried the sections far enough apart
to give striking distance; and the excuse for action was supplied by the
Dred Scott decision in 1857.

Dred Scott, a Missouri slave, claiming to be a free man under the
Missouri compromise of 1820, had sued his master, and the case had
reached the Supreme Court. A majority of the justices agreed in
dismissing the suit; but, as nearly every justice filed an opinion, and
as nearly every opinion disagreed with the other opinions on one or
more points, it is not easy to see what else is covered by the decision.
Nevertheless, the opinion of the Chief justice, Roger B. Taney,
attracted general attention by the strength of its argument and the
character of its views. It asserted, in brief, that no slave could
become a citizen of the United States, even by enfranchisement or State
law; that the prohibition of slavery by the Missouri compromise of 1820
was unconstitutional and void; that the Constitution recognized property
in slaves, and was framed for the protection of property; that Congress
had no rights or duties in the territories but such as were granted or
imposed by the Constitution; and that, therefore, Congress was bound
not merely not to forbid slavery, but to actively protect slavery in
the Territories. This was just the ground which had always been held by
Calhoun, though the South had not supported him in it. Now the South,
rejecting Douglas and his "popular sovereignty," was united in its
devotion to the decision of the Supreme Court, and called upon the North
to yield unhesitating obedience to that body which Webster in 1830 had
styled the ultimate arbiter of constitutional questions. This, it was
evident, could never be. No respectable authority at the North pretended
to uphold the keystone of Taney's argument, that slaves were regarded as
property by the Constitution. On the contrary, it was agreed everywhere
by those whose opinions were looked to with respect, that slaves were
regarded by the Constitution as "persons held to service or labor" under
the laws of the State alone; and that the laws of the State could not
give such persons a fictitious legal character outside of the State's