ed by the noble lord, that the tax now proposed is
such as never was raised in any government, because, though luxury may
confessedly be taxed, vice ought to be constantly suppressed; and
this, in his lordship's opinion, is a tax upon vice.

His lordship's distinction between luxury and vice, between the use of
things unlawful, and the excess of things lawful, is undoubtedly just,
but by no means applicable on this occasion; nor, indeed, has the
noble lord, with all his art, been able to apply it; for he was
obliged to change the terms in his argument; and, instead of calling
this tax, a tax upon strong liquors, to stigmatize it with the odious
appellation of a tax upon drunkenness.

To call any thing what it really is not, and then to censure it, is
very easy; too easy, my lords, to be done with success. To confute the
argument it is only necessary to observe, that this tax is not a tax
upon drunkenness, but a tax laid upon strong liquors for the
prevention of drunkenness; and, by consequence, such as falls within
the compass of his own definition.

That it is not a tax upon luxury cannot be inferred from the indigence
of those whom it is intended to reform; for luxury is, my lords, _ad
modum possidentis_, of different kinds, in proportion to different
conditions of life, and one man may very decently enjoy those
delicacies or pleasures to which it would be foolish and criminal in
another to aspire. Whoever spends upon superfluities what he must want
for the necessities of life, is luxurious; and excess, therefore, of
distilled spirits may be termed, with the utmost propriety, the luxury
of the poor.

This, my lords, appeared to be the opinion of the noble lord who spoke
so copiously on this question at the beginning of the debate; of this
opinion was the reverend prelate when he observed, that _necessity
itself was become luxurious_, and of this opinion must every man be
who advises such a duty to be laid upon these liquors as may at once
debar the poor from the use of them; for such a proposal evidently
supposes them unnecessary, and all enjoyment of things not necessary
is a degree of luxury.

To tax this luxury, which is, perhaps, the most pernicious of all
others, is now proposed; but it is proposed to tax it only to suppress
it, to suppress it by such slow degrees as may be borne by the people;
and I hope a law so salutary will not be opposed only because it may
afford the government a present supply.

Th