s, which nothing but a prorogation of the senate could appease.

I know, my lords, and allow, that by acting in any unusual manner with
regard to bills of this kind, we may excite the resentment of the
commons, and that some interruption of the publick business may, for
want of candour and moderation, possibly ensue.

But, my lords, I cannot think the possibility of an ill consequence an
argument sufficient to show the unreasonableness of my proposal; for
the inconveniencies that may arise from postponing the bill, are only
possible, but the calamities that we shall bring upon our country by
passing it are certain.

But we are likewise to consider, my lords, that these events, of which
it can only be said that they may happen, may also not happen. When I
reflect that the house of commons is an assembly of reasonable beings,
that it is filled by the representatives of the British people, by men
who will share the calamities of the publick, and whose interest it
is, equally with ours, to prevent the destruction of our commerce, the
decay of our manufactures, the corruption of the present age, and the
ruin of posterity, I cannot but hope that they will apply themselves
to a candid review of the bill which they have sent, and without heat,
jealousy, or disputes, explain it as they may do by another, which
will be no deviation from the rules which they have established for
themselves, and by which they may secure the happiness of their
country without receding from their own pretensions.

The duke of BEDFORD:--My lords, the proposal made by the noble lord
appears to me so prudent and equitable, so moderate and so seasonable,
and, in my opinion, suggests so easy a method of reconciling the
pretensions of the commons with the necessity of amending the bill,
that I cannot but think it worthy of the unanimous approbation of your
lordships.

I am very far from conceiving the commons to be an assembly of men
deaf to reason, or imagining them so void of all regard for the
happiness of the publick, as that they will sacrifice it to an
obstinate adherence to claims which they cannot but know to be in
themselves disputable, and of which they must at least allow that they
are only so far just as they contribute to the great end of
government, the general good.

But lest they should, by any perverse and unseasonable obstinacy,
attend more to the preservation of their own power than to the
promotion of the happiness of their const