our present purpose
how that distress was created. The effects were very grievous. In
England the panic took effect, and a run was made upon the banks for
gold; the consequence of which was, that a number of the private and
joint-stock establishments failed. In Scotland, where the distress was
certainly not less in proportion, there was not only no failure on the
part of the banks, but no run, and no diminution in the usual credits.
At this time, it is very proper to remark, that England had been
thoroughly centralized; that is, that the whole course and tendency of
its money market was to London; and indeed, for purposes of trade, the
principal circulation of the important districts of Lancashire and
others, seems to have been bills of exchange payable in London, with
from twenty to fifty endorsements on each. With us such a system was
unknown. Scotland, then as now, and we devoutly trust for ever, had
her own internal circulation, and neither took nor gave, except when
statutorily compelled, beyond the limits of her own jurisdiction.

The attention of the ministry was immediately directed to an
investigation of the cause of the general distress. This was right and
proper, and precisely what a cautious and well-meaning government
ought to do under such circumstances, in order to prevent, if
possible, the recurrence of a similar disaster. But unfortunately the
ministers of the day, though well-meaning, were any thing but
cautious. The majority of them were imbued with speculative notions of
political economy. They were disciples of a school which rejects facts
and cleaves implicitly to theory--men who threw considerations of
circumstance, time, and national characteristics aside, as prejudices
too low for even the momentary regard of a philosopher; in short, they
wished to introduce the standard of an untried rule as the _ne plus
ultra_ of human sagacity, and remorselessly to overturn every existing
institution--no matter at what sacrifice or risk--if it only seemed to
stand in the way of the operation of their darling theories.

It was easy for men so tutored and trained, to overlook the necessary
effect which fluctuation of the seasons at home and abroad must have
upon the prices of either produce, of the effect of these prices upon
manufactures, and the manifest and established fact that there is a
point when _production_ will exceed _consumption_. This state of
things it is totally beyond the power of man to remedy