e Great Duke, who was the idol of the British
people as a soldier, was the reverse of being popular as a statesman.
He was ever clear-headed and sensible; but his will would never bend to
that of the many. Desirous of human applause, he could not court it,
though he was yet vain of his celebrity, and studied to be celebrated,
knowing the value that attaches to position and to fame. Sir George
Prevost was a man of exactly an opposite disposition to that of the
Great Duke. To be great, he flattered little prejudices and weak
conceits. He never forced any measure or any opinion down another
person's throat. He was content to retain his own opinion and ever
doubted its correctness. Personally, he was brave, but he was ever
apprehensive.

In defence of the retreat of Sir George Prevost, the opinion expressed
by Lord Wellington to Lord Bathurst, in 1813, is quoted. Wellington
advised the pursuance of a defensive policy, knowing that there were
not then men sufficient in Canada for offensive warfare, and because by
pursuing a defensive system, the difficulties and risk of offensive
operations would be thrown upon the enemy, who would most probably be
foiled. This opinion was verified to the letter. On the other hand, the
authority of Wellington, who says to Sir George Murray, that after the
destruction of the fleet on Lake Champlain, Prevost must have returned
to Kingston, sooner or later, is valueless, inasmuch as His Grace in
naming Kingston, had evidently mistaken the locality of the disaster,
and must have fancied that Plattsburgh was Sackett's Harbour. He says
that a naval superiority on the Canadian lakes is a _sine qua non_ in
war on the frontier of Canada, even should it be defensive. But Lake
Champlain is not one of the Canadian lakes, and, therefore, this
justification of a military mistake is somewhat far-fetched. Sir George
Prevost failed because he feared to meet the fate of Burgoyne, and he
incurred deep and lasting censure because, when it was in his power, he
did nothing to retrieve it. Historic truth, says the historian of
Europe, compels the expression of an opinion that though proceeding
from a laudable motive--the desire of preventing a needless effusion of
human blood--the measures of Sir George Prevost were ill-judged and
calamitous.

Sir James Yeo accused Sir George Prevost of having unduly hurried the
squadron on the lake into action, at a time when the _Confiance_ was
unprepared for it; and when the