by General Lambert to
examine it and report whether it was tenable, having reported that it
was untenable unless with a larger force than Lambert could spare, he
was required to return to the left bank of the river, and the troops at
all points withdrew to their camp.

[25] Alison's History of Europe.

Defeated, far advanced into the enemy's country, an army flushed with
success, double their strength in front, and with fifteen miles of
desert between the British army and their ships, it was not long before
General Lambert came to the conclusion that instead of renewing the
attack, retreat was now desirable, and that the sooner he retreated the
more safely could it be done. For this, under the circumstances,
inevitable retreat, Lambert gathered himself up. He sent forward,
during the early part of the night of the 18th, the whole of the field
artillery, the ammunition, and the stores of every kind, excepting
eight heavy guns, which were destroyed. With the exception of eighty of
the worst cases, whom he left to the humanity of General Jackson, who
discharged that duty with a zeal and attention worthy of the man, he
also removed the whole of the wounded; and, indeed, accomplished his
retreat under the most trying circumstances, with such consummate
ability, that the whole force under his command, were safely
re-embarked on the 27th.

The defeat, which was neither attributable to want of foresight, to
incapacity, of any sort, or to lack of bravery, however humiliating it
was, but entirely to the accident which delayed a night attack until
daybreak, was in some degree compensated for by the capture of Fort
Boyer, near Mobile, commanding one of the mouths of the Mississippi.
Fort Boyer was attacked by the land and sea forces on the 12th of
February, and, with its garrison of 360 men and 22 guns, was compelled
to yield, when further operations were stayed by the receipt, on the
very next day, of intelligence that peace between Great Britain and the
United States had been concluded at Ghent.

It is asserted, with regard to the storming of New Orleans, that
Pakenham displayed imprudent hardihood, in the attempt to achieve by
force, what might have been gained by combination; and that the whole
mischief might have been avoided by throwing the whole troops instead
of only Thornton's division, on the right bank of the river, and so
have rendered unavailing all Jackson's formidable arrangements.
Pakenham's disaster was