y, between the
purposiveness and the non-purposiveness of the organs in animal and
vegetable bodies. According to Erasmus Darwin, Lamarck, and Paley,
organs are purposive; according to Mr. Darwin and his followers, they are
not purposive. But the main arguments against the system of Dr. Erasmus
Darwin are arguments which, so far as they have any weight, tell against
evolution generally. Now that these have been disposed of, and the
prejudice against evolution has been overcome, it will be seen that there
is nothing to be said against the system of Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck
which does not tell with far greater force against that of Mr. Charles
Darwin and Mr. Wallace.

REMARKS ON MR. ROMANES' MENTAL EVOLUTION IN ANIMALS. {228a}

I have said on page 96 of this book that the word "heredity" may be a
very good way of stating the difficulty which meets us when we observe
the reappearance of like characteristics, whether of body or mind, in
successive generations, but that it does nothing whatever towards
removing it.

It is here that Mr. Herbert Spencer, the late Mr. G. H. Lewes, and Mr.
Romanes fail. Mr. Herbert Spencer does indeed go so far in one place as
to call instinct "organised memory," {228b} and Mr. G. H. Lewes
attributes many instincts to what he calls the "lapsing of intelligence."
{228c} So does Mr. Herbert Spencer, {228d} whom Mr. Romanes should have
known that Mr. Lewis was following. Mr. Romanes, in his recent work,
Mental Evolution in Animals (November, 1883), endorses this, and
frequently uses such expressions as "the lifetime of the species," {228e}
"hereditary experience," {228f} and "hereditary memory and instinct,"
{228g} but none of these writers (and indeed no writer that I know of
except Professor Hering of Prague, for a translation of whose address on
this subject I must refer the reader to my book Unconscious Memory) has
shown a comprehension of the fact that these expressions are unexplained
so long as "heredity," whereby they explain them, is unexplained; and
none of them sees the importance of emphasizing Memory, and making it as
it were the keystone of the system.

Mr. Spencer may very well call instinct "organised memory" if he means
that offspring can remember--within the limitations to which all memory
is subject--what happened to it while it was yet in the person or persons
of its parent or parents; but if he does not mean this, his use of the
word "memory," his talk about