nternal one represented by the King. At Coblenz, in
the dominions of the Archbishop of Trier, the Comte de Provence had set
up what was virtually a government of his own. The _emigres_ had 3,000
or 4,000 men under arms, and a royal council organized, all that was
necessary to administer France if she could be regained. The
_Legislative_ now aimed a blow at them; the _emigres_ were to return to
France before the 1st of January 1792, and those failing to do this
were to be punishable by death. The decree was sent to the King who,
unwilling to sign assent to the death of his brother and nobles, used
his constitutional right of veto.

This was the beginning of a conflict between {131} the assembly and the
King, a struggle that showed the determination of the former not to
recognise the right of veto prescribed by the Constitution. The
_Legislative_ followed its attack on the _emigres_ by one on the
priests. The clergy was discontented and, in the west, showed signs of
inciting the peasantry to revolt; it was therefore decreed that every
member of the clergy might be called on to take the oath to the civil
constitution. This, again, the King vetoed, encouraged in his attitude
by the _Feuillants_. The old struggle was being renewed; Jacobins and
_Feuillants_ were fighting one another over the person of the King.

There was one question, however, on which the _Feuillants_ and
Brissot's wing of the Jacobins agreed; both wanted war. La Fayette,
chief figure among the _Feuillants_, had sunk rapidly in popularity
since his repression of the mob in July. In October he had resigned
his command of the national guard. In November he had been defeated by
the Jacobin Petion for the mayoralty of Paris. He now hoped for a
military command, and saw in war the opportunity for consolidating a
victorious army by means of which the King and Constitution might be
imposed on Paris.

Brissot, ambitious and self-confident, his {132} head turned at the
prospect of a conflagration, saw in a European war a field large enough
in which to develop his untried statesmanship. The pretexts for war
lay ready to hand. There was not only the tense situation arising
between Austria and France because of the relation between the two
reigning families, but there was also acute friction over certain
territories belonging to German sovereign princes, such as those of
Salm or Montbeliard, that were enclaved within the French border.
Could the extin