see the English Church
in communion with Rome and in possession of "Anglican liberties" akin
to those enjoyed by the Gallican Church. Charles was also jealous of
Louis the Fourteenth, and in many moods had no mind to play perpetually
a second fiddle. He longed for a navy to sweep the seas, for an army
strong enough to keep his Parliament in check, and for liberty for
himself and for all those of his subjects who were so minded, to hear
Mass on Sundays. Behind, and above, and always surrounding these desires
and dislikes, was an ever-present, ever-pressing need for money. Like a
royal Becky Sharp, Charles might have found it easy to be a patriotic
king on five millions a year.

The king was his own Foreign Minister, and being what he was, and swayed
by the considerations I have imperfectly described, his foreign policy
was necessarily tortuous and perplexing. As Ranke says, "Charles was
capable of proposing offensive alliances to the three neighbouring
powers, to the Dutch against France, to the French against Spain and
Holland, to the Spaniards against France to the detriment of Holland,
but in these propositions two fundamental views always recur--demands
for money, and assurance of world-wide commerce for England."[183:1]

Charles first allowed Sir William Temple, a cool, prudent man, to form,
in a famous five days' negotiation, the defensive treaty with Holland,
which, after Sweden had joined it, became known as the Triple Alliance
(1668). This alliance had for its objects mutual promises between the
contracting parties to come to each other's assistance by sea and land
if attacked by any power (France being here intended), to force Spain to
make peace with France on the terms already offered, and to compel
France to keep those terms when agreed to by Spain.

The Triple Alliance was not only very popular in England, but was good
diplomacy, for it was quite within the range of practical politics that
France and Holland might have combined against England; nor could it
easily be maintained that the alliance was hostile to France, as it
provided that Spain should be forced to accept the terms France had
already proposed.

What wrecked the Triple Alliance and prepared the way for the secret
Treaty of Dover (1670), was the impossibility of settling those
religious difficulties which, despite the Act of Uniformity, were more
rampant than ever. The king wanted to patch up peace, and to secure some
working plan of compr