re urgency and imperativeness than others. During an
emergency, as during the Great War, it might be necessary
to turn all the energies of scientific men into immediately
productive pursuits. And, since the pursuit of inquiry on a
large scale demands large resources, those researches which
give promise of beneficent human consequences will the more
readily command social sanction and approval and will be
developed at the expense of more remote speculations however
intrinsically interesting these latter may be.

Science has proved so valuable a human instrument that it
has attained a moral responsibility. Men have increasingly
come to realize that the pressing problems of our industrial
life require for their solution not the confusions and incompetences
of passion and prejudice, but an application of the
fruits of scientific inquiry. Science has already so completely
demonstrated its vast fruitfulness in human welfare, that it
must be watched with jealous vigilance. It must result as it
began, in the improvement of human welfare.[1] But what
constitutes human welfare is a question which leads us into
the final activity of the Career of Reason, Morals and Moral
Valuation, man's attempt to determine what happiness is,
and how he may attain it.

[Footnote 1:
We have already noted the danger of too complete a commitment of
science to immediately practical results. This narrows instead of broadening
possibility. As Mr. F. P. Keppel points out in a recent article, "Scholarship
in War" (_Columbia University Quarterly_, July, 1919), some of the most
important and immediately practical contributions during the Great War came
from the ranks of those who would be regarded as "pure theorists."]

CHAPTER XV

MORALS AND MORAL VALUATION

THE PRE-CONDITIONS OF MORALITY--INSTINCT, IMPULSE, AND
DESIRE. In Art and Science, man attempts to transform the
world of nature into conditions more in conformity with his
desires. In the enterprise of Morals, man attempts to discover
how to control his own nature in the attainment of happiness.
We have already had occasion to see that Art, in the
broad sense of human contrivance, is made necessary by the
incongruity between nature and human nature. We shall
examine now the conditions which make it necessary and
make it possible for man to consider and to control those
elementary impulses with which he is endowed.

The origin of the moral problem will become clearer after
a brief re