ed individuals living together. Adjustments of
conflicting interests are effected by group standards more or
less consciously transmitted and enforced by education, public
opinion, and law. We shall note presently that reflection
operates to modify and criticize these customary approvals
and disapprovals and to substitute more effective
standards. But whether on the level of custom or reflection,
the moral problem is essentially a _social_ problem, the problem
of the adjustment of the desires of individuals living together.
For an individual living altogether alone in the world there
could hardly be a moral problem, a question of "ought."
There might be problems of how to attain satisfaction, but no
sense of duty or moral obligation. Custom is the first great
stage through which morality passes, and the only form in
which morality exists for many people. In civilized life there
is, to be sure, considerable reflection and querying of custom,
but for the vast majority of men "right" and "wrong" are
determined by the standards to which their early education
and environment have accustomed them. In primitive life,
reflective criticism on the part of the individual is almost
unknown, and custom remains the great arbiter of action, the
outstanding source of social and moral control.

The values of custom as a moral force are, in both primitive
and civilized life, notable and not to be despised. Custom
is, in the first place, frequently rational in its origin. That
is, in general, those acts are made habitual in the group
which are associated with the general welfare. The customary
is the "right," but those activities most frequently
come to be regarded as "right" which are favorable to the
welfare of the group. In the literal struggle for existence
which characterizes primitive life, those tribes may alone
be expected to survive whose customs do promote the welfare
of their members. Persistence by a group in customs
like infanticide or excessive restriction of population will
result in their extinction. Customs are, for the most part,
standards of action established in the light of the conceptions
of well-being as understood at the time of their origin. The
intensity with which they are maintained, enforced, and
transmitted is an indication of how supremely and practically
important they are regarded by primitive groups.

Custom is valuable, if for nothing else, in the fact that
it makes possible some accommodation or a