moved,
which we say requires that which moves in order to its becoming motive.
In short, if it is moved, it will not abide, so far as it is moved; and
if it moves, it is necessary it should remain moving so far as it moves.
Whence then does it derive the power of abiding? For from itself it
derives the power either of being moved only, or of at the same time
abiding and being moved wholly according to the same. Whence then does
it simply obtain the power of abiding? Certainly from that which simply
abides. But, this is an immovable cause. We must therefore admit that
the immovable is prior to the self moved. Let us consider then if the
immovable is the most proper principle? But how is this possible? For the
immovable contains as numerous a multitude immovably; as the self-moved
self-moveably. Besides an immovable separation must necessarily subsist
prior to a self-moveable separation. The unmoved therefore is at the same
time one and many, and is at the same time united and separated, and a
nature of this kind is denominated intellect. But it is evident that
the united in this is naturally prior to and more honorable than the
separated. For separation is always indigent of union; but not, on the
contrary, union of separation. Intellect, however, has not the united
pure from its opposite. For intellectual form is coessentialized with the
separated, through the whole of itself. Hence that which is in a certain
respect united requires that which is simply united; and that which
subsists with another is indigent of that which subsists by itself; and
that which subsists according to participation, of that which subsists
according to essence. For intellect being self-subsistent produces itself
as united, and at the same time separated. Hence it subsists according to
both these. It is produced therefore from that which is simply united and
alone united. Prior therefore to that which is formal is the
uncircumscribed, and undistributed into forms. And this is that which we
call the united, and which the wise men of antiquity denominated being,
possessing in one contraction multitude, subsisting prior to the many.
Having therefore arrived thus far, let us here rest for a while, and
consider with ourselves, whether being is the investigated principle of
all things. For what will there be which does not participate of being?
May we not say, that this, if it is the united, will be secondary to the
one, and that by participating of
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