and
that of Fate downwards, which reigns over sensibles only. Providence
likewise differs from Fate in the same manner as deity from that which is
divine indeed, but participation, and not primarily. For in other things
we see that which has a primary subsistence, and that which subsists
according to participation. Thus the light which subsists in the orb of
the sun is primary light, and that which is in the air, according to
participation; the latter being derived from the former. And life is
primarily in the soul, but secondarily in the body. Thus also, according
to Plato, Providence is deity, but Fate is something divine, and not a
god: for it depends upon Providence, of which it is as it were the image.
As Providence too is to intelligibles, so is Fate to sensibles. And,
alternately, as Providence is to Fate, so are intelligibles to sensibles.
But intelligibles are the first of beings, and from these others derive
their subsistence. And hence the order of Fate depends on the dominion of
Providence.

In the second place, let us look to the rational nature itself, when
correcting the inaccuracy of sensible information, as when it accuses the
sight of deception, in seeing the orb of the sun as not larger than a
foot in diameter; when it represses the ebullitions of anger, and
exclaims with Ulysses,

"Endure my heart;"

or when it restrains the wanton tendencies of desire to corporeal delight.
For in all such operations it manifestly subdues the irrational motions,
both gnostic and appetitive, and absolves itself from them, as from
things foreign to its nature. But it is necessary to investigate the
essence of every thing, not from its perversion, but from its energies
according to nature. If therefore reason, when it energizes in us as
reason, restrains the shadowy impressions of the delights of licentious
desire, punishes the precipitate motion of fury, and reproves the senses
as full of deception, asserting that

"We nothing accurate, or see, or hear:"

and if it says this, looking to its internal reasons, none of which it
knows through the body, or through corporeal cognitions, it is evident
that, according to this energy, it removes itself far from the senses,
contrary to the decision of which it becomes separated from those sorrows
and delights.

After this, let us direct our attention to another and a better motion of
our rational soul, when, during the tranquillity of the inferior parts,
by a self-co