es indeed is in almost all of them the principal speaker: but when
he falls into the company of some arrogant sophist; when the modest
wisdom, and clear science of the one, are contrasted with the confident
ignorance and blind opinionativeness of the other; dispute and
controversy must of course arise: where the false pretender cannot fail
of being either puzzled or confuted. To puzzle him only is sufficient,
if there be no other persons present; because such a man can never be
confuted in his own opinion: but when there is an audience round them,
in danger of being misled by sophistry into error, then is the true
philosopher to exert his utmost, and the vain sophist to be convicted
and exposed.
In some dialogues Plato represents his great master mixing in
conversation with young men of the best families in the commonwealth.
When these happen to have docile dispositions and fair minds, then is
occasion given to the philosopher to call forth[25] the latent seeds of
wisdom, and to cultivate the noble plants with true doctrine, in the
affable and familiar way of joint inquiry. To this is owing the
inquisitive genius of such dialogues: where, by a seeming equality in the
conversation, the curiosity or zeal of the mere stranger is excited; that
of the disciple is encouraged; and, by proper questions, the mind is
aided and forwarded in the search of truth.
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[25] We require exhortation, that we may be led to true good; dissuasion,
that we may be turned from things truly evil; obstetrication, that we may
draw forth our unperverted conceptions; and confutation, that we may be
purified from two-fold ignorance.
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At other times, the philosophic hero of these dialogues is introduced
in a higher character, engaged in discourse with men of more improved
understandings and enlightened minds. At such seasons he has an
opportunity of teaching in a more explicit manner, and of discovering
the reasons of things: for to such an audience truth is due, and all
demonstrations[26] possible in the teaching it. Hence, in the dialogues
composed of these persons, naturally arises the justly argumentative or
demonstrative genius; and this, as we have before observed, according to
all the dialectic methods.
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[26] The Platonists rightly observe, that Socrates, in these cases, makes
use of demonstrative and just reasoning, ([Greek: apodeiktikou]); whereas
to the novice he is contented with ar
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