nity and sublimity are unrivaled; that it is the parent of all
that ennobles man; and, that it is founded on principles, which neither
time can obliterate, nor sophistry subvert, is the principal design of
this Introduction.

To effect this design, I shall in the first place present the reader with
the outlines of the principal dogmas of Plato's philosophy. The undertaking
is indeed no less novel than arduous, since the author of it has to tread
in paths which have been untrodden for upwards of a thousand years, and
to bring to light truths which for that extended period have been
concealed in Greek. Let not the reader, therefore, be surprised at the
solitariness of the paths through which I shall attempt to conduct him,
or at the novelty of the objects which will present themselves in the
journey: for perhaps he may fortunately recollect that he has traveled
the same road before, that the scenes were once familiar to him, and that
the country through which he is passing is his native land. At, least, if
his sight should be dim, and his memory oblivious, (for the objects which
he will meet with can only be seen by the most piercing eyes,) and his
absence from them has been lamentably long, let him implore the power
of wisdom,

From mortal mists to purify his eyes,
That God and man he may distinctly see.

Let us also, imploring the assistance of the same illuminating power, begin
the solitary journey.

Of all the dogmas of Plato, that concerning the first principle of things
as far transcends in sublimity the doctrine of other philosophers of a
different sect, on this subject, as this supreme cause of all transcends
other causes. For, according to Plato, the highest God, whom in the
Republic he calls the good, and in the Parmenides the one, is not only
above soul and intellect, but is even superior to being itself. Hence,
since every thing which can in any respect be known, or of which any
thing can be asserted, must be connected with the universality of things,
but the first cause is above all things, it is very properly said by
Plato to be perfectly ineffable. The first hypothesis therefore of his,
Parmenides, in which all things are denied of this immense principle,
concludes as follows: "The one therefore is in no respect. So it seems.
Hence it is not in such a manner as to be one, for thus it would be
being, and participate of essence; but as it appears, the one neither is
one, nor is, if it be proper to bel