not resist it. If I wanted to
take Dred Scott from his master, I would be interfering with property
and that terrible difficulty that Judge Douglas speaks of, of
interfering with property, would arise. But I am doing no such thing as
that, but all that I am doing is refusing to obey it, as a political
rule. If I were in Congress, and a vote should come up on a question
whether Slavery should be prohibited in a new Territory, in spite of the
Dred Scott decision, I would vote that it should. That is what I would
do.

"Judge Douglas said last night, that before the decision he might
advance his opinion, and it might be contrary to the decision when it
was made; but after it was made, he would abide by it until it was
reversed. Just so! We let this property abide by the decision, but we
will try to reverse that decision. We will try to put it where Judge
Douglas would not object, for he says he will obey it until it is
reversed. Somebody has to reverse that decision, since it is made, and
we mean to reverse it, and we mean to do it peaceably.

"What are the uses of decisions of Courts? They have two uses. As
rules of property they have two uses. First, they decide upon the
question before the Court. They decide in this case that Dred Scott is
a Slave. Nobody resists that. Not only that, but they say to everybody
else, that persons standing just as Dred Scott stands, are as he is.
That is, they say that when a question comes up upon another person, it
will be so decided again, unless the Court decides in another way
--unless the Court overrules its decision.--Well, we mean to do what we
can to have the Court decide the other way. That is one thing we mean
to try to do.

"The sacredness that Judge Douglas throws around this decision is a
degree of sacredness that has never before been thrown around any other
decision. I have never heard of such a thing. Why, decisions
apparently contrary to that decision, or that good lawyers thought were
contrary to that decision, have been made by that very Court before. It
is the first of its kind; it is an astonisher in legal history. It is a
new wonder of the world. It is based upon falsehood in the main as to
the facts--allegations of facts upon which it stands are not facts at
all in many instances; and no decision made on any question--the first
instance of a decision made under so many unfavorable circumstances
--thus placed, has ever been held by the professio