eemed to be giving any directions. The soldiers had their
muskets, but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close at hand.
I heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks,
and haversacks filled with rations. They seemed to think this indicated
a determination on his part to stay out and fight just as long as the
provisions held out. I turned to Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff,
who was with me, and said: "Some of our men are pretty badly
demoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to
force his way out, but has fallen back: the one who attacks first now
will be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets
ahead of me." I determined to make the assault at once on our left. It
was clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with his
entire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made on
the left before the enemy could redistribute his forces along the line,
we would find but little opposition except from the intervening abatis.
I directed Colonel Webster to ride with me and call out to the men as we
passed: "Fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemy
is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so." This acted
like a charm. The men only wanted some one to give them a command. We
rode rapidly to Smith's quarters, when I explained the situation to him
and directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his whole
division, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a very
thin line to contend with. The general was off in an incredibly short
time, going in advance himself to keep his men from firing while they
were working their way through the abatis intervening between them and
the enemy. The outer line of rifle-pits was passed, and the night of
the 15th General Smith, with much of his division, bivouacked within the
lines of the enemy. There was now no doubt but that the Confederates
must surrender or be captured the next day.
There seems from subsequent accounts to have been much consternation,
particularly among the officers of high rank, in Dover during the night
of the 15th. General Floyd, the commanding officer, who was a man of
talent enough for any civil position, was no soldier and, possibly, did
not possess the elements of one. He was further unfitted for command,
for the reason that his conscience must have troubled him and made him
afraid. As Secr
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