s.
The reports of the enemy show that their condition at the end of the
first day was deplorable; their losses in killed and wounded had been
very heavy, and their stragglers had been quite as numerous as on the
National side, with the difference that those of the enemy left the
field entirely and were not brought back to their respective commands
for many days. On the Union side but few of the stragglers fell back
further than the landing on the river, and many of these were in line
for duty on the second day. The admissions of the highest Confederate
officers engaged at Shiloh make the claim of a victory for them absurd.
The victory was not to either party until the battle was over. It was
then a Union victory, in which the Armies of the Tennessee and the Ohio
both participated. But the Army of the Tennessee fought the entire
rebel army on the 6th and held it at bay until near night; and night
alone closed the conflict and not the three regiments of Nelson's
division.
The Confederates fought with courage at Shiloh, but the particular skill
claimed I could not and still cannot see; though there is nothing to
criticise except the claims put forward for it since. But the
Confederate claimants for superiority in strategy, superiority in
generalship and superiority in dash and prowess are not so unjust to the
Union troops engaged at Shiloh as are many Northern writers. The troops
on both sides were American, and united they need not fear any foreign
foe. It is possible that the Southern man started in with a little more
dash than his Northern brother; but he was correspondingly less
enduring.
The endeavor of the enemy on the first day was simply to hurl their men
against ours--first at one point, then at another, sometimes at several
points at once. This they did with daring and energy, until at night
the rebel troops were worn out. Our effort during the same time was to
be prepared to resist assaults wherever made. The object of the
Confederates on the second day was to get away with as much of their
army and material as possible. Ours then was to drive them from our
front, and to capture or destroy as great a part as possible of their
men and material. We were successful in driving them back, but not so
successful in captures as if farther pursuit could have been made. As
it was, we captured or recaptured on the second day about as much
artillery as we lost on the first; and, leaving out the one great
|