red, and not thought of again, after it is well over. This view
cannot for a moment be defended, but, I suppose, it is very common.

* * * * *

I think the historical course of thought upon the matter has been this:
the Greek Fathers thought that, when there was a _justa causa_, an
untruth need not be a lie. St. Augustine took another view, though with
great misgiving; and, whether he is rightly interpreted or not, is the
doctor of the great and common view that all untruths are lies, and that
there can be _no_ just cause of untruth. In these later times, this
doctrine has been found difficult to work, and it has been largely
taught that, though all untruths are lies, yet that certain
equivocations, when there is a just cause, are not untruths.

Further, there have been and all along through these later ages, other
schools, running parallel with the above mentioned, one of which says
that equivocations, &c. after all _are_ lies, and another which says
that there are untruths which are not lies.

* * * * *

And now as to the "just cause," which is the condition, _sine qua non_.
The Greek Fathers make it such as these, self-defence, charity, zeal for
God's honour, and the like.

St. Augustine seems to deal with the same "just causes" as the Greek
Fathers, even though he does not allow of their availableness as
depriving untruths, spoken on such occasions, of their sinfulness. He
mentions defence of life and of honour, and the safe custody of a
secret. Also the great Anglican writers, who have followed the Greek
Fathers, in defending untruths when there is the "just cause," consider
that "just cause" to be such as the preservation of life and property,
defence of law, the good of others. Moreover, their moral rights, e.g.
defence against the inquisitive, &c.

St. Alfonso, I consider, would take the same view of the "justa causa"
as the Anglican divines; he speaks of it as "quicunque finis _honestus_,
ad servanda bona spiritui vel corpori utilia;" which is very much the
view which they take of it, judging by the instances which they give.

In all cases, however, and as contemplated by all authors, Clement of
Alexandria, or Milton, or St. Alfonso, such a causa is, in fact,
extreme, rare, great, or at least special. Thus the writer in the
Melanges Theologiques (Liege, 1852-3, p. 453) quotes Lessius: "Si absque
justa causa fiat, est abusio orationis contra v