, "Silence gives consent." Again,
silence is absolutely forbidden to a Catholic, as a mortal sin, under
certain circumstances, e.g. to keep silence, when it is a duty to make a
profession of faith.

Another mode of verbal misleading, and the most direct, is actually
saying the thing that is not; and it is defended on the principle that
such words are not a lie, when there is a "justa causa," as killing is
not murder in the case of an executioner.

Another ground of certain authors for saying that an untruth is not a
lie where there is a just cause, is, that veracity is a kind of justice,
and therefore, when we have no duty of justice to tell truth to another,
it is no sin not to do so. Hence we may say the thing that is not, to
children, to madmen, to men who ask impertinent questions, to those whom
we hope to benefit by misleading.

Another ground, taken in defending certain untruths, _ex justa causa_,
as if not lies, is, that veracity is for the sake of society, and that,
if in no case whatever we might lawfully mislead others, we should
actually be doing society great harm.

Another mode of verbal misleading is equivocation or a play upon words;
and it is defended on the theory that to lie is to use words in a sense
which they will not bear. But an equivocator uses them in a received
sense, though there is another received sense, and therefore, according
to this definition, he does not lie.

Others say that all equivocations are, after all, a kind of
lying,--faint lies or awkward lies, but still lies; and some of these
disputants infer, that therefore we must not equivocate, and others that
equivocation is but a half-measure, and that it is better to say at once
that in certain cases untruths are not lies.

Others will try to distinguish between evasions and equivocations; but
though there are evasions which are clearly not equivocations, yet it is
very difficult scientifically to draw the line between the one and the
other.

To these must be added the unscientific way of dealing with lies:--viz.
that on a great or cruel occasion a man cannot help telling a lie, and
he would not be a man, did he not tell it, but still it is very wrong,
and he ought not to do it, and he must trust that the sin will be
forgiven him, though he goes about to commit it ever so deliberately,
and is sure to commit it again under similar circumstances. It is a
necessary frailty, and had better not be thought about before it is
incur