rty, even if she has hoped
thereby to attain the same object as that desired by her father,
the decision referred to is not defeated, but is recognized and
conformed to; and, whatever her intention may have been, her
bequest is to be upheld.

Her gift to her beneficiaries is absolute in terms. They may do
what they will with the property bequeathed to them, as they may
with any other property which is lawfully their own. It is true
that the gift is accompanied by a request that they will use the
fund bequeathed "to further what is called the woman's rights
cause." A request made by one who has the right to direct is
often, perhaps generally, interpreted as a command. For this
reason, recommendatory or precatory words used in a bequest are
frequently treated as an express direction. Thus, if a legacy
were given to A., with a request that out of the sum bequeathed
he would pay to another a certain sum, or a portion thereof, it
might well be construed as a legacy, to the amount named, to such
person. The expression of the desire of the testator would be the
expression of his will, and the words in form recommendatory
would be held to be mandatory and imperative. Where such words
are used, it is therefore a question of the fair construction to
be attributed to them (_Whipple vs. Adams, 1 Met., 444; Warner
vs. Bates, 98 Mass., 274; Spooner vs. Lovejoy, 108 Mass., 529_).

But the testatrix in the case at bar has left nothing to
construction. Apparently aware that a request, where she had a
right to direct, might be treated as a command, and desirous to
make it entirely clear that no restraint or duty in any legal
sense was imposed upon her legatees, and that the request of the
will was such in the limited sense of the word only, and in no
respect mandatory, she adds thereto, referring to the legatees,
"But neither of them is under any legal responsibility to any one
or to any court to do so." Each of the legatees is therefore the
sole judge of whether she will follow, or how far or in what way
she will follow, the suggestion of the testatrix in the
disposition of the estate absolutely bequeathed to her. It is a
matter in which she is to be guided only by her judgment and
conscience, and no trust is imposed upon the property she
receives.