in social matters is gradual. We pass almost
imperceptibly from a state of public opinion that utterly
condemns some course of action to one that strongly approves it.
At what point, in the history of this change, shall we regard a
statute, the construction of which is to be affected by it, as
passed in contemplation of it? When the statute we are now
considering was passed, it probably never entered the mind of a
single member of the legislature that black men would ever be
seeking for admission under it. Shall we now hold that it cannot
apply to black men? We know of no distinction in respect to this
rule between the case of a statute and that of a constitutional
provision. When our State constitution was adopted in 1818 it was
provided in it that every elector should be "eligible to any
office in the State," except where otherwise provided in the
constitution. It is clear that the convention that framed, and
probably all the people who voted to adopt the constitution, had
no idea that black men would ever be electors, and contemplated
only white men as within any possible application of the
provision, for the same constitution provided that only white men
should be electors. But now that black men are made electors,
will it do to say that they are not entitled to the full rights
of electors in respect to holding office, because an application
of the provision to them was never thought of when it was
adopted? Events that gave rise to enactments may always be
considered in construing them. This is little more than the
familiar rule that in construing a statute we always inquire what
particular mischief it was designed to remedy. Thus, the Supreme
Court of the United States has held that in construing the recent
amendments of the federal constitution, although they are general
in their terms, it is to be considered that they were passed with
reference to the exigencies growing out of the emancipation of
the slaves, and for the purpose of benefiting the blacks
(_Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall., 67_; _Strauder vs. West
Virginia, 100 U. S. Reps., 306_). But this statute was not passed
for the purpose of benefiting men as distinguished from women. It
grew out of no exigency caused by the relation of the sexes. Its
object was wholly to secure the o