the creation of living beings, there have been causes in
action distinct in kind or degree from these now forming part of the
economy of nature. These views have been gradually modified, and some of
them entirely abandoned."[102]

The general principle which is involved in these and similar statements
may be perfectly sound, when it is applied merely to _natural events_,
occurring in the ordinary course, and according to the established
constitution of the material and moral world; but it is manifestly
inapplicable to _supernatural events_, such as the creation of the
world, or the revelation of Divine truth, since these events cannot be
accounted for by any known natural cause, and must be ascribed to the
immediate agency of a Higher Power. Without some such limitation, the
general principle cannot be admitted, since it would involve an
egregious fallacy. We must not limit Omnipotence by circumscribing the
range of its possible exercise within the narrow bounds of the existing
economy, or of our actual experience. We are not warranted to assume
that the origin of the world, on the one hand, or the establishment of
Christianity on the other, may be accounted for by _natural causes_
still known to be in actual operation. In regard to _natural events_ the
principle is sound, and it is rigorously adhered to by the expounder of
Natural Theology; in regard to _supernatural events_ it can have no
legitimate application, except in so far as it is combined with the
doctrine of efficient and final causes, which leads us up to the
recognition of a Higher Power. It might be safe and legitimate enough,
when we find a fossil organism imbedded in the earth, to ascribe its
production to the ordinary law of generation, even although we had not
witnessed the fact of its birth, provided the same species is known to
have existed previously; but when we find _new races_ coming into being,
for which the ordinary law of derivation cannot account, we are not at
liberty to apply the same rule to a case so essentially different, and
still less to postulate _a spontaneous generation_, or a _transmutation
of species_, for which we have no experience at all. In such a case, we
can only reason on the principle that _like_ effects must have _like_
causes, that marks of _design_ imply a _designing_ cause, and that
events which cannot be accounted for by _natural causes_ must be
ascribed to a Power distinct from nature, and superior to it. It is
manif