is held together by inorganic forces, and
it was built in obedience to them, but they do not explain it. It may
owe its existence and design to the thought of someone who never
touched a stone, or even of someone who was dead before it was begun.
In its symbolism it represents One who was executed many centuries ago.
Death and Time are far from dominant.

Are we so sure that when we truly attribute a sunset, or the moonlight
rippling on a lake, to the chemical and physical action of material
forces--to the vibrations of matter and ether as we know them, that we
have exhausted the whole truth of things? Many a thinker, brooding over
the phenomena of Nature, has felt that they represent the thoughts of a
dominating unknown Mind partially incarnate in it all.

CHAPTER VII

PROFESSOR HAECKEL'S CONJECTURAL PHILOSOPHY

_A reply to Mr M'Cabe._

Part of the preceding, so far as it is a criticism of Haeckel, was
given by me in the first instance as a Presidential Address to the
Members of the Birmingham and Midland Institute; and the greater
portion of this Address was printed in the _Hibbert Journal_ for
January 1905. Mr M'Cabe, the translator of Haeckel, thereupon took
up the cudgels on behalf of his Chief, and wrote an article in the
following July issue; to the pages of which references will be
given when quoting. A few observations of mine in reply to this
article emphasise one or two points which perhaps previously were
not quite clear; and so this reply, from the October number of the
_Hibbert Journal_, may be conveniently here reproduced.

I have no fault to find with the tone of Mr M'Cabe's criticism of my
criticism of Haeckel, and it is satisfactory that one who has proved
himself an enthusiastic disciple, as well as a most industrious and
competent translator, should stand up for the honour and credit of a
foreign Master when he is attacked.

But in admitting the appropriateness and the conciliatory tone of his
article, I must not be supposed to agree with its contentions; for
although he seeks to show that after all there is but little difference
between myself and Haeckel--and although in a sense that is true as
regards the fundamental facts of science, distinguishing the facts
themselves from any hypothetical and interpretative gloss--yet with
Haeckel's interpretations and speculative deductions from the facts,
especially with the mode of presentation, and