the crude and unbalanced
attacks on other fields of human activity, my feeling of divergence
occasionally becomes intense.

And it is just these superficial, and as Mr M'Cabe now admits
hypothetical, and as they seem to me rather rash, excursions into side
issues, which have attracted the attention of the average man, and have
succeeded in misleading the ignorant.

If it could be universally recognised that

"it is expressly as a hypothesis that Haeckel formulates his
conjecture as to manner of the origin of life" (p. 744),

and if it could be further generally admitted that his authority
outside biology is so weak that

"it is mere pettiness to carp at incidental statements on matters
on which Haeckel is known to have or to exercise no peculiar
authority, or to labour in determining the precise degree of
evidence for the monism of the inorganic or the organic world" (p.
748),

I should be quite content, and hope that I may never find it necessary
to carp at these things again. Also I entirely agree with Mr M'Cabe,
though I have some doubt whether Professor Haeckel would equally agree
with him, that

"there remain the great questions whether this mechanical evolution
of the universe needed intelligent control, and whether the mind of
man stands out as imperishable amidst the wreck of worlds. These
constitute the serious controversy of our time in the region of
cosmic philosophy or science. These are the rocks that will divide
the stream of higher scientific thought for long years to come. To
many of us it seems that a concentration on these issues is as much
to be desired as sympathy and mutual appreciation" (p. 748).

This is excellent; but then it is surely true that Professor Haeckel
has taken great pains to state forcibly and clearly that these great
questions cannot by him be regarded as open; in fact Mr M'Cabe himself
says--

"Haeckel's position, if expressed at times with some harshness, and
not always with perfect consistency, is well enough known. He
rejects the idea of intelligent and benevolent guidance, chiefly on
the ground of the facts of dysteleology, and he fails to see any
evidence for exempting the human mind from the general law of
dissolution" (p. 748).

Ultimately, however, he appears to have been driven to a singularly
unphilosophic view, of which Mr M'Cabe says--

"It is interesting to note that