and develop into what they consider to be
a materialistic philosophy. But there is no necessity for anything of
the kind; a systematic expression of facts in terms of one of their
aspects does not exclude expression in terms of other and totally
different aspects also. Denial of all sides but one, is a poor kind of
unification. Denial of this sort is the weakness and delusion of the
people who call themselves 'Christian Scientists': they have hold of
one side of truth--and that should be granted them,--but they hold it
in so narrow and insecure a fashion that, in self-defence, they think
it safest strenuously to deny the existence of all other sides. In this
futile enterprise they are imitating the attitude of the philosophic
Materialists, on the other side of the controversy.

And then, again, Professor Huxley himself, who is commonly spoken of by
half-informed people as if he were a philosophic materialist, was
really nothing of the kind; for although, like Newton, fully imbued
with the mechanical doctrine, and, of course, far better informed
concerning the biological departments of Nature and the discoveries
which have in the last century been made, and though he rightly
regarded it as his mission to make the scientific point of view clear
to his benighted contemporaries, and was full of enthusiasm for the
facts on which materialists take their stand, he saw clearly that these
alone were insufficient for a philosophy. The following extracts from
the 'Hume' volume will show, first, that he entirely repudiated
materialism as a satisfactory or complete scheme of things; and,
secondly, that he profoundly disagreed with the position which now
appears to be occupied by Professor Haeckel. Especially is he severe on
gratuitous denials applied to provinces beyond our scope, saying:--

"that while it is the summit of human wisdom to learn the limit of
our faculties, it may be wise to recollect that we have no more
right to make denials, than to put forth affirmatives, about what
lies beyond that limit. Whether either mind or matter has a
'substance' or not is a problem which we are incompetent to
discuss; and it is just as likely that the common notions upon the
subject should be correct as any others.... 'The same principles
which, at first view, lead to scepticism, pursued to a certain
point, bring men back to common sense'" (p. 282).

And on p. 286 he speaks concerning "substance"--that