positions of the direct
order. Whereas he ascribes the "straight" movement in the soul to the
soul's proceeding from exterior sensibles to the knowledge of
intelligible objects. The "oblique" movement in the angels he
describes as being composed of the straight and circular movements,
inasmuch as their care for those beneath them is in accordance with
their contemplation of God: while the "oblique" movement in the soul
he also declares to be partly straight and partly circular, in so far
as in reasoning it makes use of the light received from God.
Reply Obj. 3: These varieties of movement that are taken from the
distinction between above and below, right and left, forwards and
backwards, and from varying circles, are all comprised under either
straight [or] oblique movement, because they all denote discursions
of reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the species, or
from the part to the whole, it will be, as he explains, from above to
below: if from one opposite to another, it will be from right to
left; if from the cause to the effect, it will be backwards and
forwards; if it be about accidents that surround a thing near at hand
or far remote, the movement will be circular. The discoursing of
reason from sensible to intelligible objects, if it be according to
the order of natural reason, belongs to the straight movement; but if
it be according to the Divine enlightenment, it will belong to the
oblique movement as explained above (ad 2). That alone which he
describes as immobility belongs to the circular movement.
Wherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the movement of
contemplation with much greater fulness and depth.
_______________________
SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 7]
Whether There Is Delight in Contemplation?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no delight in contemplation.
For delight belongs to the appetitive power; whereas contemplation
resides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it would seem that there
is no delight in contemplation.
Obj. 2: Further, all strife and struggle is a hindrance to delight.
Now there is strife and struggle in contemplation. For Gregory says
(Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "when the soul strives to contemplate God,
it is in a state of struggle; at one time it almost overcomes,
because by understanding and feeling it tastes something of the
incomprehensible light, and at another time it almost succumbs,
because even while tasting, it fails." Th
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