fore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that "for virtue knowledge is of
little or no avail." Hence it is clear that the moral virtues belong
essentially to the active life; for which reason the Philosopher
(Ethic. x, 8) subordinates the moral virtues to active happiness.

Reply Obj. 1: The chief of the moral virtues is justice by which one
man is directed in his relations towards another, as the Philosopher
proves (Ethic. v, 1). Hence the active life is described with
reference to our relations with other people, because it consists in
these things, not exclusively, but principally.

Reply Obj. 2: It is possible, by the acts of all the moral virtues,
for one to direct one's neighbor to good by example: and this is what
Gregory here ascribes to the active life.

Reply Obj. 3: Even as the virtue that is directed to the end of
another virtue passes, as it were, into the species of the latter
virtue, so again when a man makes use of things pertaining to the
active life, merely as dispositions to contemplation, such things are
comprised under the contemplative life. On the other hand, when we
practice the works of the moral virtues, as being good in themselves,
and not as dispositions to the contemplative life, the moral virtues
belong to the active life.

It may also be replied, however, that the active life is a
disposition to the contemplative life.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 181, Art. 2]

Whether Prudence Pertains to the Active Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not pertain to the
active life. For just as the contemplative life belongs to the
cognitive power, so the active life belongs to the appetitive power.
Now prudence belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive
power. Therefore prudence does not belong to the active life.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the "active
life being occupied with work, sees less," wherefore it is signified
by Lia who was blear-eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes, so that
one may judge aright of what has to be done. Therefore it seems that
prudence does not pertain to the active life.

Obj. 3: Further, prudence stands between the moral and the
intellectual virtues. Now just as the moral virtues belong to the
active life, as stated above (A. 1), so do the intellectual virtues
pertain to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that
prudence pertains neither to the active nor to the contemplative