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ate of the perfect in particular. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What constitutes a state among men? (2) Whether among men there should be various states and duties? (3) Of the diversity of duties; (4) Of the diversity of states. _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 183, Art. 1] Whether the Notion of a State Denotes a Condition of Freedom or Servitude? Objection 1: It would seem that the notion of a state does not denote a condition of freedom or servitude. For "state" takes its name from "standing." Now a person is said to stand on account of his being upright; and Gregory says (Moral. vii, 17): "To fall by speaking harmful words is to forfeit entirely the state of righteousness." But a man acquires spiritual uprightness by submitting his will to God; wherefore a gloss on Ps. 32:1, "Praise becometh the upright," says: "The upright are those who direct their heart according to God's will." Therefore it would seem that obedience to the Divine commandments suffices alone for the notion of a state. Obj. 2: Further, the word "state" seems to denote immobility according to 1 Cor. 15:48, "Be ye steadfast (_stabiles_) and immovable"; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xxi in Ezech.): "The stone is foursquare, and is stable on all sides, if no disturbance will make it fall." Now it is virtue that enables us "to act with immobility," according to _Ethic._ ii, 4. Therefore it would seem that a state is acquired by every virtuous action. Obj. 3: Further, the word "state" seems to indicate height of a kind; because to stand is to be raised upwards. Now one man is made higher than another by various duties; and in like manner men are raised upwards in various ways by various grades and orders. Therefore the mere difference of grades, orders, or duties suffices for a difference of states. _On the contrary,_ It is thus laid down in the Decretals (II, qu. vi, can. Si Quando): "Whenever anyone intervene in a cause where life or state is at stake he must do so, not by a proxy, but in his own person"; and "state" here has reference to freedom or servitude. Therefore it would seem that nothing differentiates a man's state, except that which refers to freedom or servitude. _I answer that,_ "State," properly speaking, denotes a kind of position, whereby a thing is disposed with a certain immobility in a manner according with its nature. For it is natural to man that his head sho
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