life, but to an intermediate kind of life, of which Augustine makes
mention (De Civ. Dei xix, 2, 3, 19).

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that prudence
pertains to active happiness, to which the moral virtues belong.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 6), if
one thing be directed to another as its end, it is drawn, especially
in moral matters, to the species of the thing to which it is
directed: for instance "he who commits adultery that he may steal, is
a thief rather than an adulterer," according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. v, 2). Now it is evident that the knowledge of prudence is
directed to the works of the moral virtues as its end, since it is
"right reason applied to action" (Ethic. vi, 5); so that the ends of
the moral virtues are the principles of prudence, as the Philosopher
says in the same book. Accordingly, as it was stated above (A. 1, ad
3) that the moral virtues in one who directs them to the quiet of
contemplation belong to the contemplative life, so the knowledge of
prudence, which is of itself directed to the works of the moral
virtues, belongs directly to the active life, provided we take
prudence in its proper sense as the Philosopher speaks of it.

If, however, we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any
kind of human knowledge, then prudence, as regards a certain part
thereof, belongs to the contemplative life. In this sense Tully (De
Offic. i, 5) says that "the man who is able most clearly and quickly
to grasp the truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be
considered most prudent and wise."

Reply Obj. 1: Moral works take their species from their end, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 4, 6), wherefore the knowledge
pertaining to the contemplative life is that which has its end in the
very knowledge of truth; whereas the knowledge of prudence, through
having its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to the
active life.

Reply Obj. 2: External occupation makes a man see less in
intelligible things, which are separated from sensible objects with
which the works of the active life are concerned. Nevertheless the
external occupation of the active life enables a man to see more
clearly in judging of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence,
both on account of experience, and on account of the mind's
attention, since "brains avail when the mind is attentive" as Sallust
observes [*Bell. Catilin., LI].

Reply Obj. 3: Pr