such a contingency has arisen. A
Governor-General is careful never to conflict with a Ministry endorsed by
the electorate.

Once a man has received an appointment to a position in the civil service
of Canada he must keep absolutely aloof from politics. This is not a law
but it is a custom, the violation of which would cost a man his position.

The Parliament in the Dominion consists of the Commons and the Senate.
The Commons are elected by the people. The Senators are appointed by the
Governor-General, strictly under advice of the party in office, for life.
Senators must be thirty years of age and possess property over four
thousand dollars in value above their liabilities. The Senator resides
in the district which he represents. The Commoner may represent a
district in which he does not reside, and, on the whole, this is more of
an advantage than a disadvantage. It permits a district that has special
needs to choose a man of great character and power resident in another
district. If he fails to meet the peculiar needs of that district, he
will not be reelected. If he meets the needs of the district which he
represents he has the additional prestige of his influence in another
electoral district. A Senator can be removed for only four reasons:
bankruptcy, absence, change of citizenship, conviction of crime.

At a time when the United States is so generally in favor of the election
of Senators by direct vote, when England is trending so preponderately in
favor of curbing the veto power of the House of Lords, it seems
remarkable that Canada never questions the power of the Senator appointed
for life.

Though officially supposed to be appointed by the Governor-General, the
Senator is in reality never appointed except on recommendation of the
prevailing Cabinet which means--the party in power. The appointments
being for life and the emolument sufficient to guarantee a good living
conformable with the style required by the official position, the Senator
appointed for life--like the judge appointed for life--soon shows himself
independent of purely party behests. He is depended upon by the
Commoners to veto and arrest popular movements, which would be inimical
to public good, but which the Commoner dare not defeat for fear of defeat
in reelection. For instance, a few years ago a labor bill was introduced
in the Commons as to compensation for injuries. In theory, it was all
right. In practice, it was a blackma