tead of evils he sees sins and instead of goods
works of charity. This he can also make a matter of his reason if he
will, since he has liberty and rationality. His rationality and liberty
emerge, become manifest, take charge and give him perception and power so
far as he shuns evils as sins. So far as he does this he regards the
goods of charity as neighbor regards neighbor in mutual love.

[3] For the sake of reception and union the Lord wills that whatever a
man does freely according to reason shall seem to him to be his; this
agrees with reason itself. It follows that a man can from his reason will
something on the ground that it means his eternal happiness and can
perform it by the Lord's divine power, implored by him.

78. (iii) _Whatever a man does in freedom according to his thought is
appropriated to him as his and remains._ The reason is that a man's own
and his freedom make one. His proprium is of his life, and what he does
from his life he does in freedom. His proprium is also of his love, for
love is one's life, and what he does from his life's love he does in
freedom. We speak of his acting in freedom "according to his thought"
because what is of his life or love he also thinks and confirms by
thought, and what is so confirmed he does in freedom then according to
thought. What a man does, he does from the will by the understanding;
freedom is of the will and thought is of the understanding.

[2] A man can also act freely contrary to reason, likewise not freely in
accord with reason: then nothing is appropriated to him--what he does is
only of the mouth and body, not of the spirit or heart; only what is of
the spirit and heart, when it is also of the mouth and body, is
appropriated. The truth of this can be illustrated by many things, but
this is not the place.

[3] By being appropriated to man is meant entering his life and becoming
part of it, consequently becoming his own. It will be seen in what
follows that there is nothing, however, which is man's very own; it only
seems to him as if it were. Only this now: all the good a man does in
freedom according to reason is appropriated to him as if it were his
because it seems to be his in that he thinks, wills, speaks and does it.
Good is not man's, however, but the Lord's with man (above, n. 76). How
evil is appropriated to man will appear in a section of its own.

79. We said that what a man does in freedom in accord with his thought
also remains. For n