at the Scots talked of
the enemy 'sniping' with guns. To reconnoitre the enemy's positions
by daylight was hazardous work, and the Scots had to obtain their
first-hand knowledge of the river and the approaches to it in the dark
hours.

An officers' patrol swam the river one night, saw what the enemy was
doing, and returned unobserved. A few nights afterwards two officers
swam out to sea across the river mouth and crept up the right bank of
the stream within the enemy's lines to ascertain the locality of the
ford and its exact width and depth. They also learnt that there were
no obstacles placed across the ford, which was three feet deep in
normal times and five feet under water after rains. It was obvious
that bridges would be required, and it was decided to force the
passage of the river in the dark hours by putting covering troops
across to the northern bank, and by capturing the enemy's positions to
form a bridgehead while pontoon bridges were being constructed for the
use of guns and the remainder of the Division.

Time was all-important. December and January are the wettest months
of the season at Jaffa, and after heavy rains the Auja valley becomes
little better than a marsh, so that a small amount of traffic will cut
up the boggy land into an almost impassable condition.

The XXIst Corps' plan was as follows: At dawn on December 21 a heavy
bombardment was to open on all the enemy's trenches covering the
crossings, the fire of heavy guns to be concentrated on enemy
batteries and strong positions in the rear, while ships of the Royal
Navy bombarded two strong artillery positions at Tel el Rekket and El
Jelil, near the coast. When darkness fell covering troops were to be
ferried across the river, and then light bridges would be constructed
for the passage of larger units charged with the task of getting the
Turks out of their line from Hadrah, through El Mukras to Tel el
Rekket. After these positions had been gained the engineers were to
build pontoon bridges to carry the remainder of the Division and guns
on the night of the 22nd-23rd December, in time to advance at daylight
on the 23rd to secure a defensive line from Tel el Mukhmar through
Sheikh el Ballatar to Jelil. On the right of the 52nd Division the
54th Division was to attack Bald Hill on the night of 21st-22nd
December, and on the following morning assault the trench system
covering Mulebbis and Fejja; then later in the day to advance to
Rantieh, while