ttle had
commenced. Beersheba was taken on October 31. This appreciation was
written by Major von Papen of Yilderim headquarters on August 28,
1917:

Enver's objections, the improbability of attaining a
decisive result on the Sinai Front with two divisions plus
the 'Asia Corps' and the difficulty of the Aleppo-Rayak
transport question, hold good.

The execution of the offensive with stronger forces is
desirable, but is not practicable, as, in consequence of the
beginning of the rainy weather in the middle of November,
the British offensive may be expected at the latest during
the latter half of October; ours therefore should take place
during the first part of that month.

The transport question precludes the assembly of stronger
forces by that date.

Should the idea of an offensive be abandoned altogether
on that account?

On the assumption that General Allenby--after the two
unsuccessful British attacks--will attack only with a marked
superiority of men and munitions, a passive defence on a
thirty-five kilometre front with an exposed flank does not
appear to offer any great chance of success.

The conditions on the Western Front (defensive zone,
attack divisions) are only partially applicable here, since
the mobility of the artillery and the correct tactical handling
of the attack division are not assured. The intended passive
defensive will not be improved by the theatrical attack with
one division suggested by General von Kress.

On the contrary this attack would be without result, as
it would be carried out too obliquely to the front, and would
only mean a sacrifice of men and material.

The attack proposed by His Excellency for the envelopment
of the enemy's flank--if carried out during the first
half of October with four divisions plus the 'Asia Corps'--will
perhaps have no definite result, but will at all events
result in this: that the Gaza Front flanked by the sea
will tie down considerable forces and defer the continuation
of British operations in the wet season, during which, in
the opinion of General von Kress, they cannot be carried
on with any prospect of success.

The situation on the Sinai Front will then be clear. Naturally
it is possible that the position here may demand the
inclusion of further effectives and the Yilderim operation
consequently become impracticable. This, however, will
only prove that