d by
Bulgarians, whose task is unquestionably being lightened
through the despatch of troops (British) to Egypt.

Should this not be the case, I would be ready to exchange
two divisions from the Vth Army for the two infantry divisions
of the VIth Army Corps, as the former are only suited
for a war of position, and would have to be made mobile
by the allotment of transport and equipment.

If these two infantry divisions were given up, the Vth
Army would have only five infantry divisions of no great
fighting value, a condition of things which is perhaps not
very desirable.

For the moment my decision is: Defence of Syria by
strengthening that front by one infantry division, and
prosecution of the Yilderim scheme.

Should good prospects offer of beating the British decisively
in Syria before they have been reinforced I will take
up General von Falkenhayn's proposal again, as far as it
appears possible to carry it out, having in view the question
of transport and rationing, which still has to be settled in
some respects.--Turkish Main Headquarters, ENVER.

II

Von Falkenhayn despatched the following telegram from Constantinople
on August 25, 1917, to German General Headquarters:

The possibility of a British attack in Syria has had to
be taken into consideration from the beginning. Its repercussion
on the Irak undertaking was obvious. On that
account I had already settled in my conversations in Constantinople
during May that, if the centre of gravity of
operations were transferred to the Sinai Front, command
should be given me there too. The news now to hand--reinforcement
of the British troops in Egypt, taking over
of command by Allenby, the demands of the British Press
daily becoming louder--makes the preparation of a British
attack in Syria probable.

Jemal Pasha wishes to meet it with a defensive. To
that end he demands the divisions and war material which
were being collected about Aleppo for Yilderim. The
natural result of granting this request will be that true
safety will never be attained on the Sinai Front by a pure
defensive, and that the Irak undertaking will certainly
fritter away owing to want of driving power or to delays.

I had consequently proposed to the Turkish Higher
Command to send two divisions and the 'Asia' Corps as
quickly as possible to Southern Syria, so as to carry out
a surprise attack on