knew better than G.H.Q.
what the British public should know, and he was certain the enemy
thought we were hauling supplies through those fifty miles of sand
to our troops at El Arish, an absolutely physical impossibility, for
there were not enough camels in the East to do it. But he did not
know, and he should have known, being an Intelligence officer, that
the Turks were so far aware of where our railhead was that they were
frequently bombing it from the air. I had been in these bombing raids
and knew how accurately the German airmen dropped their eggs, and had
this Intelligence officer taken the trouble to inquire he would have
found that between thirty and forty casualties were inflicted by one
bomb at El Arish itself when railhead was being constructed. This
critic imagined that the Turk knew only what the English papers told
him. If the Turks' knowledge had been confined to what the War Office
Intelligence Branch gave him credit for he would have been in a
parlous state. While this ruling of the authorities at home prevailed
it was impossible for me to give the names of officers or to mention
divisions or units which were doing exceptionally meritorious work.
Unfortunately the bureaucratic interdict continued till within a
few days of the end of the campaign, when I was told that, 'having
frequently referred to the work of the Australians, which was
deserved,' the mention of British and Indian units would be welcomed.
We had to wait until within a month of the end of the world war before
the War Office would unbend and realise the value of the best kind
of propaganda. No wonder our American friends consider us the worst
national advertisers in the world.
The officer who was mainly responsible for the success of the Auja
crossing was Major-General J. Hill, D.S.O., A.D.C., commanding the
52nd Division. His plan was agreed to by General Bulfin, although the
Corps Commander had doubts about the possibility of its success, and
had his own scheme ready to be put into instant operation if General
Hill's failed. In the state of the weather General Hill's own
brigadiers were not sanguine, and they were the most loyal and devoted
officers a divisional commander ever had. But despite the most
unfavourable conditions, calling for heroic measures on the part of
officers and men alike to gain their objectives through mud and water
and over ground that was as bad as it could be, the movements of the
troops worked to the clock.
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