with my 20th
Century experience, and I found myself faced with the task of working
out a staff organization that was a composite of the best and most
easily applied principles of business and military efficiency, as I knew
them from the viewpoint of immediate practicality.

What I wanted was an organization that would be specialized,
functionally, not as that indicated above, but from the angles of:
intelligence as to the Sinsings' activities; intelligence as to Han
activities; perfection of communication with my own units; co-operation
of field command; and perfect mobilization of emergency supplies and
resources.

It took several hours of hard work with the Council to map out the plan.
First we assigned functional experts and equipment to each "Division" in
accordance with its needs. Then these in turn were reassigned by the new
Division Bosses to the Field Commands as needed, or as Independent or
Headquarters Units. The two intelligence divisions were named the White
and the Yellow, indicating that one specialized on the American enemy
and the other on the Mongolians.

The division in charge of our own communications, the assignment of
ultrophone frequencies and strengths, and the maintenance of operators
and equipment, I called "Communications."

I named Bill Hearn to the post of Field Boss, in charge of the main or
undetached fighting units, and to the Resources Division, I assigned all
responsibility for what few aircraft we had; and all transportation and
supply problems, I assigned to "Resources." The functional bosses stayed
with this division.

We finally completed our organization with the assignment of liaison
representatives among the various divisions as needed.

Thus I had a "Headquarters Staff" composed of the Division Bosses who
reported directly to Ned Garlin as Control Boss, or to Wilma as my
personal assistant. And each of the Division Bosses had a small staff of
his own.

In the final summing up of our personnel and resources, I found we had
roughly a thousand "troops," of whom some three hundred and fifty were,
in what I called the Service Divisions, the rest being in Bill Hearn's
Field Division. This latter number, however, was cut down somewhat by
the assignment of numerous small units to detached service. Altogether,
the actual available fighting force, I figured, would number about five
hundred, by the time we actually went into action.

We had only six small swoopers, but I had an i