en Congress was roused to a
realization that the old Civil War navy was obsolete and began to
authorize the construction of modern fighting ships. The "White
Squadron" took shape in the years after 1893. Only two armored cruisers
were in commission when Harrison left office, but the number increased
rapidly until McKinley had available for use the second-class
battleships Maine and Texas, the armored cruiser Brooklyn, and the
first-class battleships Iowa, Indiana, Massachusetts, and Oregon. From
the beginning of the McKinley Administration these, as well as the
lesser vessels of all grades, were diligently drilled and organized. The
new Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, had foreseen
and hoped for war. He spent the contingent funds on target practice, and
had the naval machine at its highest efficiency when the Maine was lost.
On March 9, 1898, Congress, in a few hours, put $50,000,000 at the
disposal of the President for national defense, and the navy spent its
share of this for new vessels, transports, and equipment. The vessels in
the Orient were mobilized at Hongkong under the command of Commodore
George Dewey; the Oregon, on station in the Pacific, was ordered home by
the long route around the Horn; the ships in the Atlantic were assembled
off the Chesapeake. Part of the latter were organized as a flying
squadron, for patrol, under Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, while
toward the end of March Captain William T. Sampson was promoted over
the heads of many ranking officers and given command of the whole North
Atlantic Squadron, including the fleet of Schley.

Congress debated a new army bill while the navy was being prepared for
war. Not until April 22 did it permit the enlargement of the little
regular army of 25,000. Until war had begun the volunteers, of whom some
216,000 were taken into the service, could not be called out or made
ready for the field. Some preparations were made within the War
Department, but the little staff of clerks, used to the small routine of
the peace basis, and having no plan of enlargement or mobilization
worked out, made little headway. The navy was ready to strike the day
war was declared, but the army had yet to be planned, recruited,
clothed, drilled, and transported to the front. The men of the navy knew
their duty and were ready for it; in the army thousands of civilians had
to blunder through the duties of strange offices. William J. Bryan
accepted the colonelcy