litical pressure. The only way
of sustaining such notes, namely, the furnishing by the States of a
full and sufficient revenue, was never attempted; for the States
themselves preferred to issue notes, rather than to tax, and when
called upon by the Continental Congress for requisitions they turned
over such amounts of paper as they saw fit. By 1780, the "continental
currency" was {107} practically worthless. Congress could rely only
upon such small sums of money as it could raise by foreign loans
through Franklin and by the contributions of a few patriotic people,
notably Robert Morris.

The maintenance of the army exhausted the resources of Congress, and
every winter saw the story of Valley Forge repeated. To secure
supplies, Congress was driven to authorize seizure and impressment of
food and payment in certificates of indebtedness. It was for this
reason, as well as from the unwillingness of the Americans to enlist
for the war, that the Continental forces dwindled to diminutive numbers
in 1781. Nothing but Washington's tireless tenacity and loyalty held
the army together, and kept the officers from resigning in disgust.
Yet it seemed impossible that Washington himself could carry the burden
much longer. The general government appeared to be on the point of
disintegrating, leaving to the separate States the task of defending
themselves. Everywhere lassitude, preoccupation with local matters, a
disposition to leave the war to the French, a willingness to let other
States bear the burdens, replaced the fervour of 1776. In other words,
the old colonial habits were reasserting themselves, and the separate
States, reverting to their former accustomed negative politics, were
{108} behaving toward the Continental Congress precisely as they had
done toward England itself during the French wars. With hundreds of
thousands of men of fighting age in America it was impossible, in 1781,
to collect more than a handful for service away from their homes. The
essentially unmilitary nature of the Americans was not to be changed.

Fortunately for the rebels, the policy of Great Britain was such as to
give them a lease of hope. In spite of the great British naval power
during the first two years of the war, no blockade had been attempted;
and after 1778 the British fleets were thoroughly occupied in following
and foiling the French. The result was that commerce of a sort
continued throughout the war, armed privateers and me